Approval Voting with Intransitive Preferences by Yang, Yongjie
Approval Voting with Intransitive Preferences
Yongjie Yang
Chair of Economic Theory
Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
yyongjiecs@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have
intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval
voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly deter-
mine who they should approve or disapprove, due to the intransi-
tivity of their preferences. An approach to address this issue is to
apply tournament solutions to help voters make the decision. We
study a class of voting systems where first each voter casts a vote
defined as a tournament, then a well-defined tournament solution is
applied to select the candidates who are assumed to be approved by
the voter. Winners are the ones receiving the most approvals. We
study axiomatic properties of this class of voting systems and com-
plexity of control and bribery problems for these voting systems.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Voting is a common method for preference aggregation and col-
lective decision-making, and has significant applications in multi-
agent systems, political elections, web spam reduction, pattern recog-
nition, etc. [17, 18, 32, 37]. For instance, in multiagent systems, it
is often necessary for a group of agents to make a collective deci-
sion by means of voting in order to reach a joint goal. Approval-
based voting systems are among the most important voting systems
and have been extensively studied in the literature [1, 3, 26, 33, 36,
45, 52, 54]. In an approval-based voting, each voter has a prefer-
ence over the candidates, and based on the preference, the voter de-
termines a subset of candidates that she approves. The winners are
the candidates that get the most approvals. In most of the approval-
based voting systems, voters are assumed to have transitive prefer-
ences. That is, if a voter prefers a candidate a to another candidate
b, and prefers b to a third candidate c, then the voter prefers a to
c. Among the most well-studied approval-based voting systems are
Approval, r-Approval and Plurality. In Approval voting, each voter
has a dichotomous preference which can be represented by a par-
tition (C1, C2) of the candidates, meaning that the voter prefers
every candidate in C1 to every candidate in C2, and are indifferent
between candidates in each Ci where i = 1, 2. Moreover, a voter
with a dichotomous preference (C1, C2) approves all candidates
in C1 and disapproves all candidates in C2. In r-Approval voting,
An extended abstract of this paper will appear in Proceedings
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each voter has a preference which is defined as a linear order over
the candidates, and approves exactly the top-r ordered candidates.
Plurality is exactly 1-Approval.
1.1 Motivation
There is no doubt that transitive preferences occur naturally in
many real-world applications. The question is whether intransitive
preferences make sense either. The answer is “Yes!”. In fact, there
exist many real-world applications where voters may have intran-
sitive preferences (see, e.g., [20, 24, 25, 39, 43]). For instance,
when voters compare candidates based on, not one, but multiple
quality parameters [20, 49]. Another natural scenario where in-
transitive preferences arise is that when the number of candidates
is considerably large [20]. In this case, it is more efficient to uti-
lize vote elicitation techniques where voters iteratively cast parts of
their preference such as pairwise comparisons. In addition, intran-
sitive preferences may also arise in the settings of sport prediction,
where an agency (e.g., a gambling company) desires to predict the
sport result for some special purpose. In order to gain a result as
precise as possible, the agency might resort to several experts, who
based on their expertise suggest the winning player in each pend-
ing match between two players. Then, based on the suggestions,
the agency applies a voting to predict the winning player(s). In this
case, each suggestion by an expert may be considered as a prefer-
ence which is not necessarily transitive, since it is commonplace
to see that a player a who beats another player b is beaten by a
third player c who is beaten by b. We refer to [34, 47] for further
discussion with several concrete examples.
Finally, we would like to point out that intransitive preferences
may also occur in district-based voting or group-based voting (a
group may be a political party, a department in a university, an af-
filiate of a company, a set of robots, etc.), where each group consists
of their own group members and is only allowed to submit one sin-
gle group vote. In such a situation, group leaders may need to first
apply a voting to derive their group vote before the whole voting. If
there are three group members whose preferences over three can-
didates a, b, c are a  b  c, b  c  a, c  a  b, respectively,
then the group vote would probably be a  b, b  c but c  a, an
intransitive preference. A significant difference between this case
and the cases mentioned above is that each intransitive preference
(group vote) in this case is drawn from the votes cast by the group
members. However, each previous mentioned intransitive prefer-
ence is cast by a single voter.
We extend the framework of approval-based voting to the set-
tings where voters may hold intransitive preferences over the can-
didates. The major difficulty of imposing the framework in these
settings is that voters with intransitive preferences are not able to
determine who they should approve. In order to address this issue,
we utilize tournament solutions. It should be noted that an intran-
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sitive preference can be represented by a tournament (we consider
only complete preferences, i.e., for every two candidates a and b
either a is preferred to b or the other way around)—a complete and
asymmetric binary relation. From the graph theory point of view,
a tournament is a directed graph where there is exactly one arc be-
tween every pair of vertices (candidates). A tournament solution
is a function that maps each tournament to a nonempty subset of
candidates. Tournament solutions as a powerful decision making
model have been extensively-studied in the literature [5, 7, 8, 38,
50]. For instance, tournament solutions have significant applica-
tions in voting. In particular, given a set of votes, we can create a
tournament based on the majority relations between the candidates
(assume that the number of votes is odd): create an arc from a to
b if there are more voters preferring a to b. Then, a tournament
solution is applied to the tournament to select the winners.
Each approval-based voting system studied in this paper is a nat-
ural combination of the classic Approval voting and a well-studied
tournament solution. Precisely, fixing a tournament solution, each
voter in this setting submits a vote which is defined as a tourna-
ment. Then, every candidate selected by the tournament solution
is approved by the voter, and every candidate not selected is disap-
proved. We remark that in practice, voters need only to cast their
votes, but leave the duty of calculating the winning candidates with
respect to the tournament solution to a second agency (e.g., a com-
puter, the voting designer, etc.), since it is unnatural to assume or
require that every voter knows how the tournament solution works.
In other words, we assume that the voters implicitly approve the
winning candidates in their cast tournaments, with respect to the
associated tournament solution. In this paper, we mainly consider
three tournament solutions, namely, the top cycle, Copeland set
and uncovered set. One reason that we choose them to study is
that they are among the most prevalent tournament solutions which
have been extensively studied in the literature. It also makes sense
to consider other tournament solutions such as minimal covering
set and tournament equilibrium set (see [5] for further tournament
solutions).
As we pointed out earlier in the example on group-based voting,
tournaments in our model are not necessarily to be cast directly by
voters, but can be also drawn from the majority relations between
the candidates according to the votes cast by some group members.
In this scenario, it makes much sense to first apply a tournament
solution to the group votes (tournaments) to determine the winning
candidates in each subvoting.
We would like to point out that apart from the model we pro-
posed in this paper, there are several other prominent approaches to
aggregate tournaments. For instance, we could apply different tour-
nament solutions to the given tournaments to determine the can-
didates implicitly approved by the voters. An explanation is that
in a group-based voting, each group (leader) is allowed to freely
choose a tournament solution to use. Another approach to select
winners from a set of tournaments would be as follows: First, we
create a tournament based on the majority relations between the
candidates, i.e., there is an arc from a to b if there is an arc from
a to b in a majority of the given tournaments. Then, we apply a
tournament solution to the tournament to select the winners. In ad-
dition, researchers have studied the model of deriving a ranking of
the candidates based on a give set of tournaments, see, e.g., [39]
and references therein.
1.2 Our Contribution
The major contribution of this work is the initialization of the
study of a class of voting systems for the scenarios where voters
may have intransitive preferences. To give a comprehensive un-
derstanding of the new voting systems, we study some axiomatic
properties of these voting systems. Axiomatic properties of voting
systems are primary factors used to evaluate voting systems and
important guidance for voting organizers to select a proper voting
system for their specific purpose in practice [19, 27, 44, 48]. In par-
ticular, we prove that these voting systems satisfy several axiomatic
properties for many common tournament solutions. As a bypro-
duct, we introduce two concepts of monotonicity for tournament
solutions, and show that the top cycle satisfies both monotonicity
criteria, while both the Copeland set and the uncovered set averse to
the monotonicity criteria. Our results concerning axiomatic prop-
erties are summarized in Theorems 1-4.
In addition, we study the complexity of strategic behavior under
these voting systems. In particular, we study control and bribery
problems. We achieve polynomial-time solvability results, NP-
hardness results as well as W[2]-hardness results. See Table 1 for a
summary of these results. A general conclusion is that these voting
systems resist more types of strategic behavior than other approval-
based voting systems such as Plurality and Approval. Studying
complexity of strategic voting problems has been the main focus
of many research papers. First, complexity is widely considered as
a prominent theoretical barrier against strategic behavior in voting
systems. Second, complexity helps practitioners decide what kind
of solution method is appropriate. For polynomial-time solvabil-
ity results, we directly provide efficient algorithms with low time
complexity. On the other hand, hardness results (e.g., NP-hardness
results and W[2]-hardness results) suggest that finding an exact so-
lution is apt to be costly or impractical, and resorting to approxima-
tion algorithms or heuristic algorithms may be a necessary choice.
Finally, it should be pointed out that complexity of strategic be-
havior for voting systems has also been considered as an important
factor to evaluate voting systems, see, e.g., [2].
2. PRELIMINARIES
Tournament. In this paper, we use the terms “candidate” and
“vertex” interchangeably. A tournament T is a pair (V (T ),)
where V (T ) is a set of candidates and  is an asymmetric and
complete binary relation on V (T ). For X,Y ⊆ V (T ) such that
X ∩ Y = ∅, X  Y means that x  y for every x ∈ X and every
y ∈ Y . For ease of exposition, we use directed graphs to represent
tournaments. Precisely, in this paper a tournament T = (V (T ),
) is considered as a directed graph where V (T ) is considered as
the vertex set and  is considered as the arc set. We refer to the
textbook by West [11] for readers who are not familiar with graph
theory.
For a candidate a ∈ V (T ), let N−T (a) denote the set of in-
neighbors of a in T and N+T (a) the set of outneighbors of a, i.e.,
N−T (a) = {b ∈ V (T ) | b  a} and N+T (a) = {b ∈ V (T ) |
a  b}. The indegree (resp. outdegree) of a is defined as |N−T (a)|
(resp. |N+T (a)|). A tournament T is regular if for every candidate
a in T it holds that ||N+T (a)| − |N−T (a)|| ≤ 1. A directed triangle
is a regular tournament with three vertices.
A directed path from a candidate a to another candidate b is a
vertex sequence (a = v1, v2, ..., vt = b) such that vi  vi+1, for
every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., t−1}. A tournament T is strongly connected if
there is a directed path from every candidate to every other candi-
date. A maximal strongly connected component of T is a strongly
connected subtournament of T with maximal vertices.
The source of a tournament T = (V (T ),) is the candidate a
so that a  b for every candidate b ∈ V (T ) \ {a}. The source is
also called the Condorcet winner of the tournament from the social
choice point of view. Clearly, not every tournament has a source.
For a subsetB ⊆ V (T ), T [B] is the subtournament induced byB,
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i.e., T [B] = (B,′) where for every a, b ∈ B, a ′ b if and only
if a  b.
Tournament Solution. A tournament solution pi is a function
that maps every tournament T to a nonempty subset pi(T ) ⊆ V (T ).
In this paper, we mainly study the following three tournament so-
lutions [5]. We refer to [5] for a comprehensive introduction to
further well-studied tournament solutions.
Copeland Set. The Copeland score of a candidate c in a tourna-
ment T is defined as the outdegree of c in T . The Copeland
set of T , denoted by CO(T ), consists of all candidates with
the highest Copeland score.
Top Cycle. The top cycle TC(T ) of a tournament T is the unique
minimal subset of candidates such that there is an arc from
every candidate in the subset to every candidate not in the
subset.
Uncovered Set. A king in a tournament is a candidate a such that
for every other candidate b, either a  b or there is another
candidate c such that a  c and c  b. It is folklore that
every tournament has at least one king [35]. The uncovered
set of a tournament T , denoted by UC(T ), is the set of all
kings of T .
It is known that for every tournament T it holdsCO(T ), UC(T ) ⊆
TC(T ) (see, e.g., [5]).
Election. An election is a tuple E = (C, T ), where C is a set
of candidates, and T is a list of votes (for convenience, the ter-
minologies “vote” and “voter” are used interchangeably through-
out this paper). In this paper, we consider only the election where
each vote is defined as a tournament T = (C,). For two can-
didates a, b ∈ C and a vote T (C,), a  b means that the vote
prefers a to b. A voting correspondence ϕ is a function that maps
an election E = (C, T ) to a nonempty subset ϕ(E) of C. We call
the elements in ϕ(E) the winners of E with respect to ϕ. If ϕ(E)
consists of only one winner, we call it the unique winner; other-
wise, we call them co-winners. For two non-overlapping lists of
tournaments T = (T1, T2, ..., Tx) and T ′ = (T ′1, T ′2, ..., T ′y), we
denote by T + T ′ the list (T1, ..., Tx, T ′1, ..., T ′y). For two elec-
tions E = (C, T ) and E ′ = (C, T ′) with the same candidate set C,
E + E ′ = (C, T + T ′).
Implicit Approval Voting. Now we introduce the core concept
in this paper—pi-Approval. Each pi-Approval is a combination of
the prevalent Approval voting and a tournament solution pi. To the
best of our knowledge, such voting correspondences have not been
studied in the literature. Let E = (C, T ) be an election.
pi-Approval
Each candidate c ∈ C is assigned a score defined as
score(c, E , pi) = |{T ∈ T | c ∈ pi(T )}|. The candidates
with the highest score are the winners.
In Approval, each voter explicitly determines herself whom she
wants to approve. In pi-Approval, each voter with preference T is
assumed to implicitly approve all candidates in pi(T ) and disap-
prove all the remaining candidates.
Properties of Voting Correspondences.
Anonymity. A voting correspondenceϕ is anonymous if reordering
the votes does not affect the winning set. That is, for every
two elections E = (C, T = (T1, ..., Tn)) and E ′ = (C, T ′ =
(Tσ(1), Tσ(2), ..., Tσ(n))) where (σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(n)) is a
permutation of (1, 2, ..., n), it holds that ϕ(E) = ϕ(E ′).
Neutrality. An election (C, T = (T1, ..., Tn)) is isomorphic to
another election (C′, T ′ = (T ′1, ..., T ′n)) where Ti = (C,i)
and T ′i = (C′,′i) for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}, if there is an one-
to-one mapping f : C 7→ C′ such that for every two distinct
candidates a, b ∈ C and every i ∈ {1, 2, ...., n}, it holds
that a i b if and only if f(a) ′i f(b). A voting corre-
spondence ϕ is neutral if for every two isomorphic elections
E = (C, T ) and E ′ = (C′, T ′), and every c ∈ C, it holds
that c ∈ ϕ(E) if and only if f(c) ∈ ϕ(E ′), where f is the
mapping as discussed above for E and E ′.
Monotonicity. A voting correspondence ϕ is monotonic if for ev-
ery two elections E = (C, T = (T1, ..., Tn)), E ′ = (C, T ′ =
(T ′1, ..., T
′
n)), and every c ∈ ϕ(E) such that for every i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n} (1) Ti[C\{c}] = T ′i [C\{c}]; and (2)N+Ti(c) ⊆
N+
T ′i
(c), it holds that c ∈ ϕ(E ′).
Majority. A voting correspondence ϕ satisfies the majority crite-
rion if for every election E = (C, T ) where there is a candi-
date c ∈ C which is the source in a majority of the tourna-
ments in T , it holds that c ∈ ϕ(E).
Consistency. A voting correspondence ϕ is consistent if for ev-
ery two elections E = (C, T ) and E ′ = (C, T ′), it holds that
ϕ(E) ∩ ϕ(E ′) ⊆ ϕ(E + E ′).
Pareto optimal. A voting correspondence ϕ is Pareto optimal if for
every election E = (C, T ) and every two candidates a, b ∈ C
such that a  b in every tournament T = (C,) ∈ T ,
a 6∈ ϕ(E) implies b 6∈ ϕ(E).
Properties of Tournament Solutions. To the names of the fol-
lowing properties of tournament solutions, we append a prefix “TS”,
standing for “tournament solution”, to avoid confusion with the
definitions of the axiomatic properties of voting correspondences.
TS-Neutrality. Two tournaments T = (C,) and T ′ = (C′,′)
where |C| = |C′| are isomorphic if there is an one-to-one
mapping f : C 7→ C′ such that for every two a, b ∈ C,
it holds that a  b if and only if f(a) ′ f(b). Here, f
is called an isomorphic mapping of T and T ′. A tournament
solution pi satisfies the TS-neutrality criterion if for every two
isomorphic tournaments T = (C,) and T ′ = (C′,′), it
holds that pi(T ′) = {f(a) ∈ C′ | a ∈ pi(T )}, where f is an
isomorphic mapping of T and T ′.
TS-Monotonicity. A tournament solution pi is TS-monotonic if for
every two tournaments T = (C,), T ′ = (C,′), and every
candidate c ∈ pi(T ) such that T [C \ {c}] = T ′[C \ {c}] and
N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c), it holds that c ∈ pi(T ′).
TS-Condorcet consistency. A tournament solution pi is TS-Condorcet
consistent if for every tournament T which admits the Con-
dorcet winner w, pi(T ) = {w}.
Now we introduce two concepts of monotonicity of tournament
solutions. To the best of our knowledge, they have not been stud-
ied in the literature. Generally speaking, a tournament solution
is TS-exclusive monotonic if a winning candidate c remains as a
winning candidate when c is preferred to more candidates, with-
out changing the preferences between other candidates. Moreover,
no nonwinning candidate benefits from this, i.e., no nonwinning
candidate becomes a winning candidate. So, if a tournament solu-
tion is TS-exclusive monotonic, then making a winning candidate
stronger never makes a nonwinning candidate better off. The for-
mal definition is as follows.
TS-Exclusive monotonicity. A tournament solution pi is TS-exclusive
monotonic if for every two tournaments T = (C,), T ′ =
(C,′), and every c ∈ pi(T ) such that (1) T [C \ {c}] =
T ′[C \ {c}]; and (2) N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c), it holds that c ∈
pi(T ′) and pi(T ′) ⊆ pi(T ).
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A tournament solution is TS-exclusive negative monotonic if when
a nonwinning candidate c is preferred to more candidates, and some
other nonwinning candidate becomes a winning candidate, then c
must become a winning candidate as well. In other words, if ex-
tending the outneighborhood of c benefits some nonwinning candi-
dates, then cmust benefit from this operation. The formal definition
is as follows.
TS-Exclusive negative monotonicity (TS-ENM). A tournament so-
lution pi satisfies the TS-ENM criterion, if for every two tour-
naments T = (C,) and T ′ = (C,′), and every candi-
date c 6∈ pi(T ) such that (1) T [C \ {c}] = T ′[C \ {c}]; and
(2) N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c), it holds that pi(T ′) 6⊆ pi(T ) implies
c ∈ pi(T ′).
Parameterized Complexity. A parameterized problem is a lan-
guageL ⊆ Σ∗×N, where Σ is a finite alphabet. The first component
I ∈ Σ∗ is called the main part, and the second component k ∈ N
is called the parameter. Downey and Fellows [15] established the
parameterized complexity theory and developed the following pa-
rameterized complexity hierarchy:
FPT ⊆ W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ ... ⊆ XP.
In particular, FPT (stands for fixed-parameter tractable) includes all
parameterized problems which admit O(f(k) · |I|O(1))-time algo-
rithms. Here f(k) is a computable function of k and |I| is the size
of the main part. Given two parameterized problems Q and Q′, an
FPT-reduction from Q to Q′ is an algorithm that takes as input an
instance (I, k) ofQ and outputs an instance (I ′, k′) ofQ′ such that
(1) the algorithm runs in f(k) · |I|O(1) time, where f is a com-
putable function in k;
(2) (I, k) ∈ Q if and only if (I ′, k′) ∈ Q′; and
(3) k′ ≤ g(k), where g is a computable function in k.
A problem is W[i]-hard for a positive integer i if all problems in
W[i] can be FPT-reducible to the problem. W[i]-hard problems are
unlikely to admit FPT-algorithms, unless the parameterized com-
plexity hierarchy collapses at some level [15].
3. AXIOMATIC PROPERTIES
In this section, we study axiomatic properties for pi-Approval for
different tournament solutions pi. It is fairly easy to check that pi-
Approval is anonymous for all tournament solutions pi. Moreover,
pi-Approval is neutral for all tournament solutions pi which satisfy
the TS-neutrality criterion. Furthermore, pi-Approval satisfies the
majority criteria for all pi that are TS-Condorcet consistent. We
now study some other properties for pi-Approval. Consider first the
consistency criterion.
THEOREM 1. pi-Approval is consistent for all tournament solu-
tions pi.
PROOF. Let E1 = (C, T1) and E2 = (C, T2) be two elections
such that pi(E1) ∩ pi(E1) 6= ∅. For a candidate c ∈ C, it holds that
score(c, E1 + E2, pi) = score(c, E1, pi) + score(c, E2, pi).
This directly implies that if a candidate c ∈ C has the highest score
in both E1 and E2, then c has the highest score in the combined
election E1 + E2. It then follows that pi(E1 + E2) = pi(E1) ∩
pi(E2).
Now we study the monotonicity of pi-Approval for all TS-Condorcet
consistent tournament solutions pi. It should be noted that almost
all commonly used tournament solutions, including all tournament
solutions studied in this paper, are TS-Condorcet consistent. We
derive both sufficient and necessary conditions for such pi-Approval
to be monotonic.
THEOREM 2. Let pi be a TS-Condorcet consistent tournament
solution. Then, pi-Approval is monotonic if and only if pi satisfies
the TS-exclusive monotonicity and TS-ENM criteria.
PROOF. Let pi be a TS-Condorcet consistent tournament solu-
tion as stated in the theorem and ϕ = pi-Approval. Assume that pi
satisfies the TS-exclusive monotonicity and the TS-ENM criteria.
Let E = (C, T = (T1, ..., Tn)) and E ′ = (C, T ′ = (T ′1, ..., T ′n))
be two elections with the same candidate set C. Moreover, let
c ∈ ϕ(E) be a candidate such that (1) Ti[C \ {c}] = T ′i [C \ {c}];
and (2) N+Ti(c) ⊆ N+T ′i (c) for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. We shall
show that c ∈ ϕ(E ′). Let’s first study the scores of the candi-
dates in E ′. Apparently, score(c, E , pi) ≥ score(c′, E , pi) for ev-
ery c′ ∈ C \ {c}. Since pi is TS-exclusive monotonic, if c ∈ pi(Ti)
for some Ti ∈ T , then c ∈ pi(T ′i ). For each a ∈ C, let Wa =
{i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} | a 6∈ pi(Ti), a ∈ pi(T ′i )}. The following claim
is useful.
Claim. Wc′ ⊆ Wc for every c′ ∈ C \ {c}.
Let c′ be a candidate in C\{c}, and Ti and T ′i be two tournaments
in T and T ′, respectively, such that c′ 6∈ pi(Ti) and c′ ∈ pi(T ′i ).
Clearly, pi(T ′) 6⊆ pi(T ). Since pi is TS-exclusive monotonic, it
must be that c 6∈ pi(Ti); since otherwise, pi(T ′) ⊆ pi(T ), a con-
tradiction. Then, since pi satisfies the TS-ENM criterion, we know
that c ∈ pi(T ′). The claim follows.
Due to the above claim and discussions, for every c′ ∈ C \ {c},
score(c, E ′, pi) = score(c, E , pi) + |Wc|
≥ score(c′, E , pi) + |Wc|
≥ score(c′, E , pi) + |Wc′ |
≥ score(c′, E ′, pi).
Thus, c ∈ ϕ(E ′).
It remains to prove the other direction. Assume that pi is not
TS-exclusive monotonic. Then, there exist two tournaments T and
T ′ over the same candidate set C and a c ∈ pi(T ) such that (1)
T [C\{c}] = T ′[C\{c}]; (2)N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c); and (3) c 6∈ pi(T ′),
or c ∈ pi(T ′) but pi(T ′) 6⊆ pi(T ). If c 6∈ pi(T ′) in Condition (3),
then, the election consisting of only one vote defined as T ob-
viously shows that pi-Approval is not monotonic. Otherwise, we
construct an election as follows. Let b be any arbitrary candidate in
pi(T ′) \ pi(T ). The election consists of the following votes: 1 vote
defined as T ; 2 votes each defined as a tournament where b is the
source; 1 vote defined as a tournament where c is the source. Ap-
parently, both b and c are winners in the election, with each having
two approvals. However, by replacing the vote defined as T by T ′,
b gets one more approval from T ′, implying c is no longer a winner.
Therefore, in this case pi-Approval is not monotonic.
Assume that pi does not satisfy the TS-ENM criterion. Then,
there exist two tournaments T and T ′ and a c 6∈ pi(T ) such that (1)
T [C \ {c}] = T ′[C \ {c}]; (2) N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c); and (3) pi(T ′) 6⊆
pi(T ) and c 6∈ pi(T ′). We construct an election as follows. Let b
be any arbitrary candidate in pi(T ′) \ pi(T ). The election consists
of the following votes: 1 vote defined as T ; 1 vote defined as a
tournament where b is the source; 1 vote defined as a tournament
where c is the source. It is clear that both b and c are winners.
However, by replacing the vote defined as T by T ′, b gets one more
approval from T ′, implying c is no longer a winner. Therefore, in
this case pi-Approval is not monotonic.
Due to Theorem 2, to check whether pi-Approval is monotonic
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for each pi ∈ {TC,UC,CO}, we need only to investigate if pi satis-
fies the TS-exclusive monotonicity and TS-ENM criteria. Though
that the TS-monotonicity of pi for each pi ∈ {CO,UC,TC} is appar-
ent and has been studied in the literature [5], whether pi satisfies the
two variants of the TS-monotonicity criterion is not equally easy to
see. In fact, we prove that among the three tournament solutions,
only the top cycle satisfies the both the TS-exclusive monotonic-
ity and the TS-ENM criteria. It then follows from this fact and
Theorem 2 that TC-Approval is monotonic, but CO-Approval and
UC-Approval are not. Our results concerning the above discussion
are summarized in Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 shown below.
LEMMA 1. Top cycle satisfies the TS-exclusive monotonicity and
TS-ENM criteria.
PROOF. We first show that the top cycle is TS-exclusive mono-
tonic. Let T = (C,) and T ′ = (C,′) be two tournaments, and
c ∈ TC(T ) be a candidate such that (1) T [C \ {c}] = T ′[C \ {c}]
and (2)N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c). Since the top cycle is TS-monotonic [5],
it holds that c ∈ TC(T ′). It remains to show that TC(T ′) ⊆
TC(T ). Due to the definition of the top cycle, it holds that TC(T ) 
C \ TC(T ). Then, it holds that TC(T ) ′ C \ TC(T ). It directly
follows that TC(T ′) ⊆ TC(T ).
Now we prove that the top cycle satisfies the TS-ENM criterion.
Let T = (C,) and T ′ = (C,′) be two tournaments, and c ∈ C
be a candidate such that c 6∈ TC(T ), T [C \ {c}] = T ′[C \ {c}],
and N+T (c) ⊆ N+T ′(c). Let CC1, CC2, ..., CCt be the maximal
strongly connected components of T . It is known that for every two
distinct CCi and CCj where {i, j} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., t}, it holds that ei-
ther V (CCi)  V (CCj) or V (CCj)  V (CCi), where V (CCi)
denotes the vertices of CCi. Moreover, there is a unique order-
ing (CCρ(1), CCρ(2), ..., CCρ(t)) where {ρ(1), ρ(2), ..., ρ(t)} =
{1, 2, ..., t} such that CCρ(i)  CCρ(j) for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤
t [40]. Furthermore, TC(T ) = CCρ(1). Without loss of gener-
ality, assume that c ∈ CCρ(i) for some 1 < i ≤ t. We shall
show that either TC(T ′) = TC(T ), or TC(T ′) 6⊆ TC(T ) and
c ∈ TC(T ′). Due to the above discussion, if CCρ(1) ′ {c} in
T ′, then TC(T ′) = TC(T ) = CCρ(1). Assume now that there
exists some candidate b in CCρ(1) such that c ′ b. We distinguish
between the following cases to proceed the proof.
Case 1. CCρ(i) = {c}, or |CCρ(i)| > 1 and c is the source of
T ′[CCρ(i)].
Let j be the minimum integer such that i > j ≥ 0 and {c} ′⋃
i>j′>j CCρ(j′). If j = 0, then {c} is the top cycle of T ′. Other-
wise, (
⋃
1≤j′≤j CCρ(j′)) ∪ {c} is the top cycle of T ′.
Case 2. |CCρ(i)| > 1 and c is not the source of T ′[CCρ(i)].
In this case,
⋃
1≤j≤i CCρ(j) is the top cycle of T
′.
In summary, we can conclude that either TC(T ′) = TC(T ), or
TC(T ′) 6⊆ TC(T ) and c ∈ TC(T ′). Thus, the top cycle satisfies
the TS-ENM criterion.
Both the Copeland set and the uncovered set do not satisfy TS-
ENM. Counter-examples can be found in Figure 1. Due to The-
orem 2, both CO-Approval and UC-Approval are not monotonic.
Due to Theorem 2, Lemma 1, and the above discussion, we have
the following theorem.
THEOREM 3. TC-Approval is monotonic, and UC-Approval and
CO-Approval are not monotonic.
Finally, we study the Pareto optimal criterion.
THEOREM 4. TC-Approval is Pareto optimal, and CO-Approval
and UC-Approval are not Pareto optimal.
a b
cd
a
b
cd
e
Figure 1: The left tournament illustrates that the Copeland set
does not satisfy the TS-ENM criterion. In this tournament {d}
is the Copeland set. However, reversing the arc between a and
d makes {b, d} the Copeland set. The right tournament illus-
trates that the uncovered set does not satisfy the TS-ENM cri-
terion. In this tournament {e, c, d} is the uncovered set. How-
ever, reversing the arc between a and d makes {b, c, d, e} the
uncovered set.
PROOF. We first show that TC-Approval is Pareto optimal. Let
ϕ =TC-Approval. Let E = (C, T ) be an election and a, b ∈ C
be two candidates such that a  b in every T = (C,) ∈ T
and a 6∈ ϕ(E). We need to prove that b 6∈ ϕ(E). It is clear that
if a 6∈ TC(T ) for some T ∈ T , then b 6∈ TC(T ). Therefore,
score(a, E , TC) ≥ score(b, E , TC). Since a 6∈ ϕ(E), there is a
candidate d ∈ C\{a} such that score(d, E , TC) > score(a, E , TC).
As a result, score(d, E , TC) > score(b, E , TC), implying that
b 6∈ ϕ(E). To prove that CO-Approval and UC-Approval are not
Pareto optimal, one only needs to check the election with four
candidates a, b, c, d and one vote with preference a  b, {b} 
{d, c}, {c}  {a, d} and d  a. It is easy to see that {b, c} is
the winning set in CO-Approval, but all votes (in this case only one
vote) prefer a to b. On the other hand, {a, b, c} is the winning set
in UC-Approval, but all votes prefer d to a.
4. COMPLEXITY OF STRATEGIC BEHAV-
IOR
An obstacle to the fairness of voting systems is strategic behav-
ior, potentially carried out by strategic individuals. For instance, a
strategic individual wants to change the election result by adding/deleting
some voters/candidates, or by bribing some voters. We refer to [4,
6, 12] for comprehensive surveys on this topic. In this section, we
study the complexity of strategic behavior in pi-Approval. We as-
sume the familiarity of complexity theory. For readers who are not
familiar with complexity theory, we refer to [28, 46].
We particularly study the control and the bribery problems. In
each problem, there is a strategic individual who has an incentive
to influence the election result by modifying the registered election
(see later for explanation of registered election). Depending on the
situations, the strategic individual may have the goal to make a
given distinguished candidate p win the registered election, or have
the goal to make p not win the registered election. The former case
is indicated by the word “constructive”, and the latter case by the
word “destructive”. Following the convention in the literature [24,
30, 53], for each problem studied in this paper, we distinguish be-
tween the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
2A voting system is immune to a constructive (resp. destructive)
strategic voting problem if it is impossible to change a nonwinning
(resp. winning) candidate to a winning (resp. nonwinning) candi-
date by performing the operations imposed in the definition of the
problem.
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Plurality Approval TC-Approval CO-Approval UC-Approval Evidence
CCAV P NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard Theorem 5
CCDV P NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard Theorem 5
CCAC NP-hard I NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard Theorem 7
CCDC NP-hard P NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard Theorem 7
DCAV P P P P P Theorem 6
DCDV P P P P P Theorem 6
DCAC NP-hard P NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard Theorem 7
DCDC NP-hard I NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard Theorem 7
CBRA - - P NP-hard W[2]-hard Theorem 8
DBRA - - P P W[2]-hard Theorem 9
Table 1: A summary of the complexity of strategic voting problems. Our results are boldfaced. The results for Plurality and
Approval are from [30]. In the table, “P” stands for “polynomial-time solvable”, and “I” stands for “immune” 2. The W[2]-hardness
results are with respect to the number of arcs that can be reversed in total. The W[2]-hardness results are based on FPT-reductions,
but not polynomial-time reductions. It remains open whether CBRA and DBRA for UC-Approval are NP-hard. CBRA and DBRA
are not defined for Plurality and Approval. All results in the table apply to both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner
model.
In the unique-winner model, winning an election means to be the
unique winner, while in the nonunique-winner model, winning an
election means to be the unique winner or to be a co-winner.
Now we explain what modification operations the strategic indi-
vidual may perform.
Control. In the control problems studied in this paper, the strate-
gic individual may perform one of the following four modifica-
tion operations: adding/deleting at most k votes/candidates, where
k > 0 is a given integer. Therefore, the combination of the two
goals and the four modification operations gives us in total eight
control problems denoted by CCAV, CCDV, CCAC, CCDC, DCAV,
DCDV, DCAC and DCDC. The first two characters “CC”/“DC”
in the notations stand for “constructive control”/“destructive con-
trol”, and the last two characters “AV”/“DV”/“AC”/“DC” stand for
“adding votes”/“deleting votes”/“adding candidates”/“deleting can-
didates”.
In the inputs of all control problems, we have a set C of candi-
dates, a list T of votes over C, a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and
an integer k > 0. A registered election consists of all registered
candidates and registered votes. In CCDV/DCDV, all candidates
and votes are registered. The question is whether the strategic in-
dividual can achieve his goal by deleting at most k votes from T .
In CCAV/DCAV, all candidates are registered, but not all votes. In
particular, a sublist U ⊆ T of unregistered votes is given in the in-
put. The question is whether the strategic individual can achieve his
goal by adding (registering) at most k votes in U . In CCDC/DCDC,
all candidates and votes are registered. The question is whether the
strategic individual can achieve his goal by deleting at most k can-
didates from C \ {p}. It should be pointed out that the deletion of a
candidate does not affect the preference of a vote over the remain-
ing candidates. In CCAC/DCAC, all votes are registered but not
all candidates. In particular, a subset D ⊆ C \ {p} of unregistered
candidates is given in the input. The question is whether the strate-
gic individual can achieve his goal by adding (registering) at most
k candidates in D.
The above defined control problems for many voting systems
have been extensively studied in the literature. Due to the work of
many researchers, the complexity of these control problems for al-
most all commonly used voting systems is known. A motivation of
the study of control problems is that the issues of adding/deleting
votes/candidates occur in many electoral settings, see, e.g., [5, 23]
for some concrete examples. In addition, as argued in [23], adding
voters pertains to simply encouraging some agents to vote, multi-
plying the existing agents, or performing false-name attacks. We
refer to [2, 5, 24, 30, 52, 53] for further discussions on control
problems.
Bribery. We study two bribery problems: Constructive Bribery
by Reversing Arcs (CBRA) and Destructive Bribery by Reversing
Arcs (DBRA). In both problems we are given an election E =
(C, T ), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and an integer k > 0. The
question is whether the strategic individual can achieve his goal by
reversing at most k arcs in total in tournaments in T .
We remark that CBRA and DBRA have already been studied
under the name microbribery [24]. However, the complexity of
CBRA/DBRA for pi-Approval has not been studied yet.
The study of bribery problems was initiated by Faliszewski, Hema-
spaandra and Hemaspaandra [21], and since then many bribery
problems have been proposed and studied [9, 10, 13, 22, 31, 42,
56, 55]. A major motivation of such studies is that bribery be-
havior in voting happens in many real-world situations, such as in
political elections. Our results concerning the complexity of con-
trol and bribery problems are summarized in Table 1. We achieve
polynomial-time solvability results, NP-hardness results, as well as
W[2]-hardness results for the control and bribery problems for pi-
Approval for different tournament solutions pi. We compare our
complexity results for pi-Approval with the previous known results
for the two most relevant voting systems Plurality and Approval.
Our results reveal that pi-Approval resists more types of strategic
behavior than both Plurality and Approval. We need the following
two problems to establish our hardness results.
Exact 3 Set Cover (X3C)
Input: A universal set U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ} and a collection S of
3-subsets of U .
Question: Is there an S′ ⊆ S such that |S′| = κ and each ci ∈ U
appears in exactly one set of S′?
We assume that each element ci ∈ U occurs in exactly three
different 3-subsets of S. Thus, we have that |S| = 3κ. This as-
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sumption does not change the NP-hardness of the problem [29].
A dominating set of a tournament T = (V,) is a vertex subset
D of the tournament such that for every vertex v not in D, there is
a vertex u in D such that u  v.
TOURNAMENT DOMINATING SET (TDS)
Input: A tournament T = (V,) and an integer k > 0.
Parameter: k.
Question: Does T have a dominating set of size at most k?
It is known that TDS is W[2]-hard [16].
4.1 Complexity of Election Control
In this section, we study the complexity of control by adding/deleting
votes/candidates for pi-Approval for difference tournament solu-
tions pi. We first study CCAV and CCDV. We show that both prob-
lems for pi-Approval for pi being several natural tournament solu-
tions are NP-hard, as summarized in the following theorem. Recall
that both problems are polynomial-time solvable for Plurality but
NP-hard for Approval [30].
THEOREM 5. CCAV and CCDV are NP-hard for pi-Approval
for every pi ∈ {TC,UC,CO}, for both the unique-winner model
and the nonunique-winner model.
PROOF SKETCH. We first consider the unique-winner model of
CCAV. The following reduction applies to every pi ∈ {TC, UC, CO}.
Let I = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S = {s1, s2, ..., s3κ}) be an
instance of the X3C problem. We create an instance (C, T , p ∈
C,U ⊆ T , k) for the CCAV problem as follows.
Candidates C. We create in total 3κ+2 candidates. In particular,
for each ci ∈ U , we create a candidate a(ci). In addition, we have
a distinguished candidate p and a dummy candidate q.
Registered votes T \ U . For each ci ∈ U , we create κ − 1
votes, each represented by a tournament where a(ci) is the source.
The arcs between candidates in C \ {a(ci)} are set arbitrarily. In
addition, we create 1 vote defined as a tournament where p is the
source. The arcs between candidates in C\{p} can be set arbitrarily.
Unregistered votes U . For each si = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S where
{x, y, z} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., 3κ}, we create a vote represented by a tour-
nament Tsi such that a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), p, q induce a regular sub-
tournament and, moreover there is an arc from every candidate in
the set {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), p, q} to every candidate not in the set.
The arcs between candidates in C \ {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), p, q} are
set arbitrarily. Observe that for every pi ∈ {TC, UC, CO}, it holds
that pi(Tsi) = {cx, cy, cz, p, q}.
Finally, we set k = κ. It is easy to see that with the registered
votes, each candidate a(ci) where i ∈ {1, ..., 3κ} has pi-Approval
score κ − 1, the distinguished candidate p has pi-Approval score
1, and the dummy candidate q has pi-Approval score 0. Observe
that q cannot have an equal or higher pi-Approval score than that of
p no matter which unregistered votes are added, since all unregis-
tered votes approve both p and q. Observe further that adding any
one unregistered vote increases the pi-Approval score of some can-
didate a(ci) where i ∈ {1, ..., 3κ} to κ. Hence, in order to make
p the unique winner, we need add exactly k unregistered votes. As
a result, p has pi-Approval score κ + 1 in the final election. More-
over, for every a(ci) where i ∈ {1, ..., 3κ}, we can add only one
unregistered vote that approves a(ci). This happens if and only if
there is an exact 3-set cover.
The NP-hardness reduction for the nonunique-winner model is
similar to the above reduction with the difference that we create
one more registered vote for each ci ∈ U .
Now we consider the CCDV problem for the unique-winner model.
We construct an instance (C, T , p ∈ C, k) as follows.
Candidates C. We create in total 3κ+ 1 candidates in C. In par-
ticular, for each ci ∈ U , we create a candidate a(ci). In addition,
we have a distinguished candidate p.
Votes T . For each si = {cx, cy, xz} ∈ S where {x, y, z} ⊆
{1, 2, ..., 3κ}, we create a vote represented by a tournament Tsi
where a(cx), a(cy), a(cz) form a directed triangle and, moreover,
there is an arc from every candidate in {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)} to
every candidate in C\{a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)}. It is easy to check that
pi(Tsi) = {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)} for every pi ∈ {TC, UC, CO}.
In addition, we create 3 votes, each represented by a tournament
where p is the source.
Since each ci occurs in exactly three sets in S, each a(ci) where
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 3κ} as well as p has pi-Approval score 3. In order to
make p the unique winner, for each a(ci) where i ∈ {1, ..., 3κ},
we need to delete one vote that approves a(ci). This happens if and
only if there is an exact 3-set cover.
The NP-hardness reduction for the CCDV problem for the nonunique-
winner model is similar to the above reduction, with only the dif-
ference that we create one less vote corresponding to p, so that the
pi-Approval score of p in the original election is 2.
Now we consider DCAV and DCDV. It is known that both prob-
lems are polynomial-time solvable for Plurality and Approval [30].
We prove that both problems are polynomial-time solvable for ev-
ery pi-Approval where pi is a polynomial-time computable tourna-
ment solution. A tournament solution pi is polynomial-time com-
putable if for every tournament T , the set pi(T ) can be calculated
in polynomial time in the size of T . It is well known that the top cy-
cle, the uncovered set and the Copeland set are all polynomial-time
computable [5]. It is worth mentioning that there exist numerous
tournament solutions such as the tournament equilibrium set which
are not polynomial-time computable. See [5] for further discus-
sions.
THEOREM 6. DCAV and DCDV are polynomial-time solvable
for pi-Approval such that pi is polynomial-time computable, for both
the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
PROOF. To prove the theorem, we reduce DCAV (resp. DCDV)
for pi-Approval where pi is a polynomial-time computable tour-
nament solution to the same problem for Approval in polynomial
time. In particular, given an instance of DCAV (resp. DCDV) for pi-
Approval, we calculate pi(T ) for every vote T in the instance (for
both registered and unregistered votes if applicable). Since pi is
polynomial-time computable, this can be done in polynomial time.
Then, we can get an instance of DCAV (resp. DCDV) for Approval
by taking the same candidate set, and changing each vote originally
defined as a tournament T to a vote defined as the dichotomous
preference (pi(T ), C \ pi(T )), where C is the candidate set. The
theorem then follows from the fact that DCAV (resp. DCDV) for
Approval is polynomial-time solvable, for both the unique-winner
model and the nonunique-winner model [30].
Theorem 6 implies that DCAV and DCDV are polynomial-time
solvable for TC-Approval, CO-Approval and UC-Approval.
Now we turn our attention to control by adding/deleting candi-
dates. In Plurality, each vote is defined as a linear order over the
candidates and the top ordered candidate is approved. A linear or-
der can be considered as a transitive tournament, where there is an
arc from a candidate a to another candidate b if a is ordered before
b. Thus, the top ordered candidate in the linear order is the source
of the transitive tournament. It is clear that the top cycle, Copeland
set and uncovered set of a transitive tournament consist of exactly
the source of the tournament. Hence, CCAC/CCDC/DCAC/DCDC
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for Plurality is a special case of the same problem for pi-Approval
for every pi ∈ {TC, UC, CO}. Since CCAC/CCDC/DCAC/DCDC
for Plurality is NP-hard [30], for both the unique-winner model and
the nonunique-winner model, the same problem for pi-Approval for
each pi ∈ {TC, UC, CO} is NP-hard as well3, as summarized in the
following theorem.
THEOREM 7. CCAC/CCDC/DCAC/DCDC is NP-hard for pi-
Approval for every pi ∈ {TC,UC,CO}, for both the unique-
winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
4.2 Complexity of Bribery
Now we study CBRA and DBRA for pi-Approval for different
tournament solutions pi. Since reversing an arc may make a transi-
tive tournament intransitive, it does not make sense to study CBRA
and DBRA for Plurality and Approval.
THEOREM 8. CBRA is W[2]-hard for UC-Approval, NP-hard
for CO-Approval, and polynomial-time solvable for TC-Approval,
for both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
PROOF. Yang and Guo [51] studied a problem where the given
are a tournament and a distinguished vertex p in the tournament,
and the question is whether p can be made a king by reversing
at most k arcs. In particular, they proved that this problem is
W[2]-hard with respect to k, by a reduction from the TDS prob-
lem (See [51] for further details). This problem can be consid-
ered as a special case of the nonunique-winner model of the CBRA
problem for UC-Approval, where the instances consist of only one
vote. To prove the W[2]-hardness of CBRA for UC-Approval for
the unique-winner model, we need only to create one more vote
defined as a tournament where the distinguished candidate p is the
source (the arcs between other candidates can be set arbitrarily) in
the reduction in [51].
Now we prove the NP-hardness of CBRA for CO-Approval by
a reduction from the X3C problem. We first study the nonunique-
winner model. Let (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S = {s1, s2, ..., s3κ})
be an instance of the X3C problem. We create an instance (C, T , p ∈
C, k = κ) of CBRA as follows. Without loss of generality, assume
that k ≥ 4.
Candidates C. We create in total 6κ + 1 candidates in C. For
each cx ∈ U , we create a candidate a(cx). For each si ∈ S,
we create a candidate a(si). In addition, we have a distinguished
candidate p.
Votes T . We create in total 3k2+4k+2 votes. For ease of expo-
sition, we divide the votes into three sublists A,B,C. The sublist
A consists of the following votes. For each si = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S,
we create a vote defined as a tournament Hsi = (C,si) such that
(1) a(cx) si a(cy), a(cy) si a(cz), a(cz) si a(cx); (2) there
is an arc from a(si) to every of {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)}; (3) there is
an arc from every {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)} to every candidate in C \
{a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)}; (4) there is an arc from a(si) to every
candidate in C \ {a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), a(cu), a(cv)}, and an
arc from each of {a(cu), a(cv)} to a(si), where a(cu) and a(cv)
are any two arbitrary candidates in C\{a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), p};
and (5)Hsi [C\{a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)}] is regular. It is easy to
verify that inHsi , the Copeland score of each a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)
is 6k−2, and of each other candidate is at most d 6k−3
2
e+2. Thus,
the Copeland set ofHsi is {a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)}. Moreover,
due to the large score gap between candidates in the Copeland set
3From a parameterized complexity point of view, Yang and
Guo [52] proved that the CCDC problem for Plurality is W[1]-hard
with respect to the number of deleted candidates even in 3-peaked
elections.
and candidates not in the Copeland set (and due to k ≥ 4), no can-
didate in C \ {a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)} can be included in the
Copeland set of Hsi by reversing at most k arcs. The sublist B
consists of k + 2 votes, each of which is defined as a tournament
such that p is the source, and the subtournament induced by C \{p}
is regular. Finally, the sublistC consists of the following 3k2 votes.
For each cx ∈ U , we create k votes, each of which is defined as
a tournament such that a(cx) is the source and the subtournament
induced by C \ {a(cx)} is regular. Notice that due to the regularity
of the subtournaments induced by all candidates except the sources
in all tournaments constructed in sublists B and C, it is impossi-
ble to change the Copeland set of every tournament in B ∪ C by
reversing at most k arcs. It is easy to verify that the CO-Approval
score of p is k + 2, of each a(cx) where cx ∈ U is k + 3, and of
each a(si) where si ∈ S is 1.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that S′ ⊂ S is an exact 3-set cover, i.e. |S′| =
κ = k and for every cx ∈ U there is exactly one s ∈ S′ such that
cx ∈ s. We shall show that we can make p a winner by reversing
at most k arcs. In particular, for each si = {ax, ay, az} ∈ S′, we
reverse the arc from a(si) to a(cu), where a(cu) is one candidate
in C \ {a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), p} such that a(cu) si a(si),
as defined above. After reversing this arc, the Copeland set of Hsi
consists of only the candidate a(si). As a result, the CO-Approval
score of each {a(cx), a(cy), a(cz)} decreases by one. Since S′
is an exact 3-set cover, due to the construction, after reversing all
these k arcs, the CO-Approval score of each a(cx) where cx ∈ U
is k + 2 and of each a(si) where si ∈ S is 1. Moreover, the CO-
Approval score of p is k + 2, implying that p is a winner.
(:⇐) Observe that due to the score gap between every a(si)
where si ∈ S and p, none of a(si) has a chance to have a CO-
Approval score that is equal to or higher than that of p by reversing
at most k arcs. Moreover, as discussed above, we cannot include
p in the Copeland set of each tournament in A ∪ C by revers-
ing at most k arcs. Therefore, in order to make p a winner, for
each a(cx) where cx ∈ U , we need to decrease the number of
tournaments whose Copeland sets include a(cx) by at least one.
Due to the above discussion, we cannot change the Copeland set
of each tournament in B ∪ C by reversing at most k arcs. Thus,
the optimal solution is to reverse arcs in tournaments in A. More-
over, if we attempt to reverse arcs in some tournament Hsi in
A, the optimal choice is to only reverse an arc from a(si) to a
candidate a(cu) ∈ C \ {a(si), a(cx), a(cy), a(cz), p} such that
a(si) si a(u) in Hsi (such a candidate a(cu) exists due to the
construction of the votes), so that the CO-Approval score of each
a(cx), a(cy), a(cz) decreases by one. Let A′ be the set of tourna-
ments in A where an arc is reversed. Let S′ = {si | Hsi ∈ A′}.
Due to the above discussion, for every cx ∈ U , there is at least one
Hsi ∈ A′ such that cx ∈ si. Since we can reverse at most k arcs,
it holds that |A′| ≤ k, implying that S′ is an exact 3-set cover.
To prove the unique-winner model of the problem, we need only
to create one more vote in B in the above reduction.
Now we study destructive bribery by reversing arcs.
THEOREM 9. DBRA is W[2]-hard for UC-Approval, and polynomial-
time solvable for TC-Approval and CO-Approval. The results hold
for both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
PROOF. We first prove the W[2]-hardness of DBRA for UC-
Approval for the nonunique-winner model. We develop an FPT-
reduction from the TDS problem to the DBRA problem. Let (T =
(V,), k) be an instance of the TDS problem. Let n = |V |. We
assume that n ≥ (k+ 1)(2k+ 4). This assumption does not affect
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the W[2]-hardness of the TDS problem4. We create an instance
I = (C, T , p ∈ C, k) for DBRA as follows.
Candidates C. For each v ∈ V , we create a candidate a(v). Let
the distinguished candidate p be any arbitrary candidate a(w) such
thatw is not a king in T (in the W[2]-hardness reduction of the TDS
problem in [14], there exist vertices w which are not kings. Thus,
such a candidate a(w) is well defined). In addition, we create an
additional candidate q. Thus, C = {a(v) | v ∈ V } ∪ {q}.
Votes T . The list T of votes consists of three sublists T1, T2, T3
of votes. The list T1 consists of only one vote T1 = (C,1), which
is created first with a copy of T , i.e., a(v) 1 a(u) in T1 if and
only if v  u in T . Then, we create an arc from every candidate
in C \ {q} to q. The list T2 consists of 2k + 3 votes, each of
which is defined as a tournament such that q is the source. The arcs
between every two candidates in C \ {q} are set arbitrarily. The
construction of the votes in T3 is a little involved. Let A be any
arbitrary (k + 1)(2k + 3)-subset of C \ {p, q}, and B = C \ (A ∪
{p, q}). Let (A0, A1, ..., A2k+2) be any arbitrary partition of A
such that |Ai| = k + 1 for every i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2k + 2}. Let fi be
any arbitrary one-to-one mapping from Ai to A(i+1) mod (2k+3)
for every i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2k + 2}. We create in total 2k + 3 votes in
T3. In particular, for each i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2k + 2}, we create a vote
defined as a tournament Hi such that
(1) there is an arc from p to every candidate in C \ (Ai ∪ {p});
(2) there is an arc from a candidate a(v) ∈ A(i+1) mod (2k+3)
to a candidate a(u) ∈ Ai if and only if fi(a(u)) = a(v);
(3) there is an arc from every candidate in Ai to every candidate
in C \ (Ai ∪A(i+1) mod (2k+3));
(4) there is an arc from every candidate in C \ {q} to q;
(5) Hi[Ai] is isomorphic to Hi[A(i+1) mod (2k+3)]; and
(6) there is no source in Hi[Ai].
The arcs that are not specified above are set arbitrarily. It is clear
that such a tournament can be constructed in polynomial time. Ob-
serve that {p} ∪ {Ai} is the uncovered set of Hi. Moreover, by
constructing the votes this way, it is impossible to make q a king in
each tournament Hi in T3 by reversing at most k arcs.
Now we show the correctness of the reduction. It is easy to cal-
culate that in the election, both p and q have the same UC-Approval
score 2k + 3, and every other candidate has UC-Approval score at
most 2. Thus, {p, q} is the UC-Approval winning set of the elec-
tion.
(⇒:) Let D ⊆ V (T ) be a dominating set of size at most k of T .
After reversing all arcs (a(v), q) where v ∈ D in T1, q becomes
a king in T1. As a result, q has UC-Approval score 2k + 4 and p
still has UC-Approval score 2k + 3, implying that p is no longer a
winner.
(:⇐) Suppose that I is a YES-instance. Observe that due to
the large UC-Approval score gap between p and every candidate in
C \ {p, q}, none of C \ {p, q} has a chance to have a higher score
than that of p by reversing at most k arcs. Therefore, q is the only
candidate which can prevent p from being a winner. Moreover, due
to the above discussion, it is impossible to make q a king in each
vote in T3 by reversing at most k arcs. Given that q is the unique
king in each tournament in T2, in order to prevent p from being a
winner, q has to become a king in the first vote T1 by reversing at
most k arcs. This happens only if there is a dominating set of T of
size at most k .
To prove the unique-winner model, we need only to create one
less tournament in T2.
Now we develop a polynomial-time algorithm for DBRA for TC-
4If n ≤ (k + 1)(2k + 3), we can add (k + 1)(2k + 4)− n addi-
tional vertices to the tournament such that there is an arc from every
vertex in the original tournament to every newly added vertex.
Approval for the nonunique-winner model.
TC-Approval. Let (C, T , p ∈ C, k) be an instance where p is
a TC-Approval winner. Let m = |C|. We assume that m ≥ 3
(otherwise, we can easily solve the problem). To prevent p from
being a winner, we need to make a candidate q have a higher TC-
Approval score than that of p by reversing at most k arcs. Based on
this observation, the algorithm breaks down the given instance into
m−1 subinstances, each of which takes a candidate q 6= p together
with (C, T , p ∈ C, k) as the input, and asks whether q can have a
higher TC-Approval score than that of p by reversing at most k
arcs. Obviously, the original instance is a YES-instance if and only
if at least one of the subinstances is a YES-instance. It remains
to develop a polynomial-time algorithm to solve each subinstance.
The following claim is useful.
Claim. Let H = (V,) be a tournament and c ∈ V a candidate
not in the top cycle of H . Then, we can make c be included in the
top cycle of H by reversing only one arc.
Proof of the claim. LetCCρ(1), CCρ(2), ..., CCρ(t) be the unique
ordering of the maximal strongly connected components ofH such
that CCρ(i)  CCρ(j) for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t. The top cycle of
H is exactlyCCρ(1). Assume that c ∈ CCρ(i) for some 1 < i ≤ t.
Then, by reversing any one arbitrary arc between c and a candidate
in CCρ(1),
⋃
1≤j≤i V (CCj) becomes the top cycle of the tourna-
ment (see the proof of Lemma 1 for some additional details). This
completes the proof of the above claim.
Since m ≥ 3, it is impossible to decrease the score gap between
p and q by 2 by reversing 1 arc. Then, due to the above claim,
to prevent p from being a winner, an optimal choice is to reverse
arcs in the tournaments whose top cycles do not include q in ad-
vance. Precisely, the algorithm finds all tournaments in the subin-
stance where q is not in the top cycle. Let k′ be the number of such
tournaments. Then, due to the above discussion, we can increase
the TC-Approval score of q by min{k, k′} without changing the
TC-Approval score of p, by reversing min{k, k′} arcs. As a re-
sult, if score(q, E , TC) + min{k, k′} ≥ score(p, E , TC) where
E = (C, T ), the subinstance is a YES-instance; otherwise, it is a
NO-instance.
It should be noted that Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [41] de-
vised an O(nO(logn))-time algorithm for the TDS problem, which
implies that the TDS problem is probably not NP-hard, unless NP⊆
DTIME(nlogn). In fact, Downey and Fellows proved the W[2]-
hardness of the TDS problem by a reduction from the Dominat-
ing Set problem which is both NP-hard and W[2]-hard [14]. How-
ever, the reduction is an FPT-reduction but not a polynomial-time
reduction—it takesO(2O(k) ·poly(n)) time where n is the number
vertices of the given tournament and k is the solution size. Hence,
our reductions in the proofs of Theorems 8 and 9 do not imply that
DBRA and CBRA for UC-Approval are NP-hard. Whether DBRA
and CBRA for UC-Approval are NP-hard remain open.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied a class of approval-based voting correspon-
dences for the scenario where voters may have intransitive prefer-
ences. Each newly introduced voting correspondence pi-Approval
is a natural combination of the classic Approval correspondence
and a well-studied tournament solution pi. In particular, each voter
with preference T is assumed to approve all candidates in pi(T )
and disapprove all the remaining candidates. The winners are the
ones receiving the most approvals. This class of new voting cor-
respondences extends the classic Approval voting to the settings
where voters have intransitive preferences. Note taht an intran-
sitive preference is not necessarily to be cast by a single voter,
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but can be drawn from the preferences of voters in a subvoting,
as we illustrated in the introduction. As far as we know, such pi-
Approval voting correspondence has not been studied in the liter-
ature. In this paper, we first showed that pi-Approval satisfies sev-
eral axiomatic properties for pi ∈ {CO,TC,UC}. As a byproduct,
we proposed two new concepts of monotonicity criteria of tour-
nament solutions, namely, the TS-exclusive monotonicity and the
TS-ENM, and proved that the top cycle satisfies both monotonicity
criteria, while the Copeland set and the uncovered set fail to sat-
isfy TS-ENM. Then, we investigated the complexity of construc-
tive/destructive control by adding/deleting voters/candidates and
constructive/destructive bribery by reversing arcs for pi-Approval
for pi ∈ {CO,UC,TC}. Our results reveal that pi-Approval resists
more types of strategic behavior than both Plurality and Approval.
See Table 1 for a summary of our complexity results.
There remain several open questions for future research. For in-
stance, is top cycle the minimal tournament solution that satisfies
TS-neutrality, TS-exclusive monotonicity and TS-ENM? In addi-
tion, it is interesting to explore whether CBRA and DBRA for UC-
Approval are NP-hard.
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